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Abstract
The deployment of decentralized productions units (DPU) like rooftop
solar panels is a major challenge for energy transition. Under a net me-
tering system where the meter runs backward when there is excessive PV
production, the electricity produced is valued at the retail price. Higher
retail prices thus encourage the deployment of DPU. In this paper, we
study the impact of tariffs on the decision to install residential solar PV in-
stallations. We analyze a panel data from Wallonia, where tariffs depend
largely from volumetric charges. We exploit the presence of 13 differ-
ent grid operators with different tariffs, to disentangle this relationship.
Using various specifications, our results suggest that a one eurocent per
kWh of tariff increase leads to, all else equal, an increase of around 5% in
the number of new installations.
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1 Introduction
The traditional electricity system faces many challenges with the transition to-
wards greener energy. New modes of production do not only have a tremen-
dous impact at the production stage. A key issue for the distribution system
operators (DSO) is to integrate distributed generation units (DPU), like resi-
dential solar panels, that are connected to the low voltage grid. By installing
solar panels, households do not only consume the green energy that they pro-
duce, they are also using the grid to make power exchanges. Indeed, a grid-
connected DPU can import electricity when the production is insufficient to
cover the consumption and export the excessive power when production ex-
ceeds consumption. There are thus a new kind of exchanges with the grid.
There are different methods to price these power exchanges between a DPU
and the grid and the financial return of a DPU is influenced by both the pricing
structure and the price level (see Brown and Sappington (2017) and Gautier et
al. (2018)). Consequently, we should observe a larger deployment of DPU in
those regions offering a higher return on investment. Our objective is to test
this relationship.
We use municipality-level data from 2008 to 2016 from the Walloon re-
gion, the southern region of Belgium. We focus on residential PV investments,
which, as of today, have been made by close to 10% of the households. PV
panels are connected to the grid and, when there is excessive production by
the panels, the electricity is supplied to the grid. Under the net metering sys-
tem used in Wallonia, the meter runs backward when electricity is supplied to
the grid. Therefore, the electricity produced is valued at the retail price. One
important component of the retail price is the grid tariff which represents ap-
proximately 40% of the price. Our estimation strategy takes advantage of the
fact that tariffs are set by one of the 13 distribution system operators present on
1
the territory, while energy policies, including those aimed at supporting the
transition towards a green energy system, are set for the most at the regional
and national levels. Key advantages of our setting are the wide variability
across places and time of tariffs and the fact that, in Wallonia, tariffs are in
large part dependent on the amount of electricity consumed, i.e. tariffs are vol-
umetric. In addition to take advantage of cross sectional and inter-temporal
variation in tariffs, we also control for various socioeconomic, housing and
political factors. We believe that this approach allows us to obtain estimates
reliable for policy purposes.
We find that higher consumption-based tariffs do provide incentives to in-
vest in residential PVs, as net metering increases the returns on investment.
Using various estimation approaches, we find that an increase in the distribu-
tion tariff by one eurocent per kWh leads to an increase of around 5% in the
amount of new PVs installed by households.
The determinants of the emergence of renewable energy sources in the en-
ergy system has already received much attention from the literature since the
first analysis from Menz and Vachon (2006) or Carley (2009). Interests in in-
vestments in solar panels by residential households are much more recent. For
example, the various factors behind PV adoption are studied in Vasseur and
Kemp (2015) and De Groote et al. (2016). Using data at the household level or
at the aggregated level such as the block, municipality or supra-municipality
(county or utility), the literature has mostly focused on two issues. First, some
authors have analyzed the role of social spillovers on the diffusion of resi-
dential PVs as in Bollinger and Gillingham (2012), Muller and Rode (2013),
Graziano and Gillingham (2014) or Rode and Weber (2016). For example,
Allan and McIntyre (2017) analyze a municipality-level data set from Great
Britain. Using spatial econometrics techniques, they examine and confirm
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the presence of peer effects in the adoption of this solar technology. Second,
more recently, other authors have also analyzed the effectiveness of policy in-
centives like upfront rebates, tax exemptions, tax credits or policies such as
renewable portfolio standards (see Hughes and Podolesky (2015) and Crago
and Chernyakhoskiy (2017)).
Empirical papers focusing on the link between grid-related factors and PV
adoptions by residents are relatively scarce. They were mainly focused on the
access to the power grid in the context of developing countries (McEachern
and Hanson (2008) and Smith and Urpelainen (2014)). Using U.S. state-level
data, Matisoff and Johnson (2017) study the role played by net-metering poli-
cies, that allow residents to sell the over-supply of electricity to the energy grid
at a price equal to the retail price. They find that net-metering policies, on a
stand-alone base, are ineffective in encouraging households to invest in PVs.
However, coupled with financial incentives, especially in the form of upfront
cash incentives, this conclusion is reversed. Hence, financial incentives and
net metering policies complement each others.
This work also relates to the theoretical literature interested in the regu-
lation of natural monopolies (Joskow (2007)). For example, Brown and Sap-
pington (2017) study how the energy grid operator can break-even despite
the emergence of distributed generation. To induce a desired level of decen-
tralized production, fixed fee should be introduced in addition to volumetric
charges, and if feasible additional fixed charges levied from decentralized pro-
ducers should be introduced. Gautier et al. (2018) further on argue that vol-
umetric charges are particularly problematic in settings where net-metering
systems are implemented, as observed in Wallonia. Furthermore, the so-called
prosumers have limited incentives to synchronize their local production with
their consumption.
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This paper attempts to measure the elasticity of investment in PV with re-
spect to tariffs. We believe that our estimation will be of further use for the
literature trying to quantify the impact of decentralized production units on
the grid over time using numerical models like Cai et al. (2013), Darghouth
et al. (2016) or Castaneda et al. (2017). While many papers have used sim-
ilar parameters to study this question, to our knowledge, none of them had
precise empirical motivations for the parameter chosen. Overall, our results
also highlight the problems faced by grid operators that are highly dependent
on volumetric charges to recover their mostly fixed costs. Hence, it calls for
a higher reliance on capacity payments (Borenstein (2016)), even though con-
cerns about efficiency, redistribution and the consequences of usage-related
externalities should not be overshadowed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background of the
energy sector in Wallonia, and more precisely about the policy context sur-
rounding tariffs regulations and residential PV investments. Section 3 presents
the data while Section 4 discusses our empirical strategy. Our results are pre-
sented in Section 5. In Section 6, we conclude and analyze some policy impli-
cations.
2 Residential PV in Wallonia
Belgium is composed of 3 regions: Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia. Wallonia
is the largest in area and has more than 3.5 millions inhabitants. It is composed
of 262 municipalities. In terms of energy policy, regions have the responsibil-
ities to meet the targets about electricity production from renewable sources
and to regulate the distribution of electricity. All other production as well as
transmission issues are regulated at the national level.
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2.1 Support to solar energy in Wallonia
Residential solar PV installations of less than 10 kWp are the focus of this
paper. As shown on Figure 1, by the end of 2016, Wallonia had more than
130 000 households with PV installed in their residence, with a total capac-
ity of 699 MWp. These installations produced 686 GWh of electricity in 2016.
A striking fact described on this graph is that the most fruitful year in term
of PV investments was the year 2012, even though the price of PV panels
have continuously decreased since then. The main reason behind this shape
is the very generous support system present in Wallonia and progressively
discarded after 2012. Starting in 2008, Wallonia installed several mechanisms
to support the deployment of small-scale solar panels by households. The
supporting mechanism for residential installations (less than 10 kWp) is com-
posed of several elements: a net metering system, a subsidy for the production
of energy from renewable ressources, investment subsidies (mainly tax cuts)
and, in some cases, additional grants from local government levels.
Net metering Households who install solar panels are making two types
of exchange with the grid: imports from the grid when local production is
insufficient to cover consumption and exports to the grid when production
exceeds the consumption. To measure the exchanges with the grid, household
are equipped with a single meter and the meter runs backwards when electric-
ity is exported. This system is known as net metering. The meter measures net
imports of energy, consumption minus production and net imports are used
as the basis for the energy billing. With net metering, the energy produced by
the solar panels is valued at its market value. In Wallonia, should the yearly
production exceeds the yearly consumption (a negative index on the meter),
there is no additional payment for these net exports and the electricity bill is
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Figure 1: New and accumulated residential PV installations in Wallonia (2008-
2017)
equal to zero. With net metering, a higher grid tariff increases the return on
PV investment.
Solwatt and Qualiwatt To support the production of green energy, Wallo-
nia choose a tradable green certificate (GC) mechanism. Green certificates are
awarded for the production from certified renewable sources at a rate of 1GC
per MWh of green electricity produced. Energy retailers must use the GC to
certify that a given percentage of their energy supply is green. To that end, GC
are traded on a dedicated market and the regulator added a price floor at 65e
and a price ceiling at 100e. With a granting rate of 1GC per MWh, solar panels
were not profitable. In 2008, the Solwatt plan changed this granting rate to 7
GC per MWh for solar PV installations of less than 10 kWp and extended the
grant period. The technology started to spread quickly as the mechanism was
quite generous with an estimated direct support of 588 e per MWh produced
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(Boccard and Gautier, 2015). As from 2011, the grant rate and the grant peri-
ods were modified (see table 1) but this changed applied to new installations
exclusively. The generous granting of GC to solar panels disequilibrated the
GC market and the Solwatt system was replaced in March 2014 by a new sup-
porting scheme named Qualiwatt. Installations supported by Qualiwatt have
a guaranteed return on investment. The DSO pays a yearly premium to the
PV installation owner during 5 years. The premium is based on the installed
capacity. As the compensation is part of the return, DSO charging a higher
network fee pay a lower premium. Under Qualiwatt supporting scheme, the
benefit of a higher grid tariff is partially offset by a lower premium. The Quali-
watt mechanism will be over in June 2018 and at this time new PV installations
will no longer get a subsidy.
Grant rate Grant period Application
(GC/MWh) (years) period
7 15 years Jan. 2008 - Nov. 2011
7 10 years Dec. 2011- Mar. 2012
6 10 years Apr. 2012 - Aug. 2012
5 10 years Sep. 2012 - Mar. 2013
1,5 10 years Apr. 2013 - Feb. 2014
Table 1: Grant rate and grant period of GC, Solwatt mechanism
Investment subsidies During the period 2008-2011, investments in solar PV
were eligible for an income tax rebate. The federal government supported in-
vestments in energy saving technologies, including solar panels, by allowing
household to deduct installation expenses from their taxable incomes.
Different premia were offered to support investments in solar PV. The
Walloon government offered an investment premium from 2008 to March
2010. The premium was calculated as a percentage of the investment and
was capped. Some local governments (provinces and municipalities) decided
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to offer additional premium for the investment. In the timespan of our study,
households in 80 municipalities have benefited from a local support mecha-
nism at some time.
2.2 Distribution tariff
With the unbundling of the electricity system, the distribution of electricity is
operated by local monopolies and 13 of them are now active on the territory
of Wallonia covering from one municipality to about 60 of them, see Fig. 2.
On average, as of 2017, distribution tariffs make 37% of the resident’s final
electricity bill (CWaPE (2017)). Distribution tariffs are regulated by the energy
regulator active in Wallonia: The CWaPE. The regulator decides on a tariff
methodology for a regulatory period of four years and the system in place is
close to a cost-plus regime. Eligible costs were passed through consumers and
the distribution tariff is adjusted yearly. Each DSO has its own tariff and there
is no uniform pricing in Wallonia.
One particularity of the distribution bill in Wallonia is that it is for the
most based on the volume of electricity consumed (Hinz et al. (2018)). For an
average consumption of 3500 kWh per year, an average resident of Wallonia
will have a bill related to the distribution of electricity that depends only at
around 6% from fixed/capacity charges. The rest depends on the volume of
electricity consumed. This reliance on the volumetric part is one of the highest
observed in Europe, only equalled by the one observed in Hungary and the
UK (European Commission (2015)).
Consumers have the choice between a single tariff or a dual tariff with
a different rate for day and night consumptions (with the weekend being
counted as night consumption). The following figure reports the single tar-
iff (including VAT) for the 13 DSO for the period 2008- 2016. As shown on
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Figure 2: Map of Belgium with the 13 GRD active in Wallonia
Fig.3, distribution tariffs have been on the rise over the past 10 years, with
the exception of the year 2014 where a transitory change in the VAT rate was
applied. During our period of observations, the average tariff went from 7.8
to 10.5 eurocent/kWh. Although this rise has been heterogenous across Wal-
lonia. Even if there is some within variation (0.92), most of the variation is
between (1.39) our unit of analysis, the GRD. This heterogeneity reflects dif-
ferences in local costs of distributing electricity and differences in the relative
efficiency of the DSO. In average, the difference between the highest and the
lowest tariff is equal to 10 eurocent/kWh.
For solar PV owner, a 1 eurocent difference in the distribution tariff trans-
lates into an additional saving of 10e per MWh produced. This means that,
in 2016, an installation producing 6 MWh has an extra yearly return of 442.8
e in the municipalities served by GASELWEST where the distribution tariff
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was the highest (14.60 eurocent/kWh) compared to municipalities served by
AIEG where it was the lowest (7.22 eurocent/kWh). With a life time over 20
years for a solar panel, we expect that these substantial differences will have
an impact on the decision to invest in solar PV installations.
Figure 3: Evolution of the distribution tariff in the 13 GRD active in Wallonia
(2008-2016)
3 Data
The CWaPE, the regulatory body responsible for the energy sector in Wallonia,
collects information about the PV systems installed by residents. We have data
since 2008, and PVs were scarce before then. Registration to the regulator is
compulsory to be eligible for the subsidizing schemes. This information is
aggregated at the municipality level for each years. The main reasons for this
are because the information at the sub municipality level is imprecise and all
our control variables are only available at the municipality/year level. We
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have information about both the number of installations and the production
capacity of each installation in kilowatt. There are two important things to
note. First we have to drop six municipalities where two distribution system
operators are active.1 We end up with 256 municipalities remaining out of the
262 present in Wallonia. Second, the presence of municipalities where no PV
panel were installed in a given year is very limited as it is only the case in 14
out of 2039 municipality/year observations.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Dependent variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Number of PV installations 59.977 85.487 0 1330 CWaPE
Capacity of PV installed 344.95 495.196 0 7527.21 CWaPE
Independent variables
Tariff (eurocent/kWh) 8.81 1.67 4.967 14.602 CWaPE
% of houses 18.016 12.827 1 56.7 Walstat
% built after 81 21.74 7.01 5.4 40.3 Walstat
% unemployed 12.651 4.476 3.6 28.7 Walstat
Population (log of) 9.062 0.799 7.214 12.225 Walstat
Median Income (log of) 9.995 0.127 9.63 10.445 Walstat
% foreigners 6.526 5.669 1.47 50.4 Walstat
Average age 40.303 1.573 35 46.7 Walstat
Local subsidies (log of) 0.176 2.827 -1.204 7.23 Self-collected
% vote green party 15.007 6.304 4.37 31.83 Federal Public Service
Our explanatory variable is tariff. It is the distribution tariff (VAT included)
paid for each kilowatt per hour of electricity consumed and is measured in eu-
rocent. Tariffs are set by the CWaPE separately for each of the 13 distribution
system operators covering the region.2 This data was also provided by the
1As we do not know the precise address of the investment and the distribution system
operator frontier whithin the municipality, it is complicated to give a weight of the importance
of the two DSOs or to use the same discontinuity as Ito (2014) with household level data.
2Remark that taking the log of the tariff, including the (comparatively small) fixed part of
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CWAPE.3
We also control for various factors split into three categories: housing, so-
cioeconomic and political factors. The two housing factors we control for are
% of houses and % built after 1981. The former which is the share of buildings
that are stand-alone houses is expected to positively impact the number of in-
stallations as it can be complex to install solar panels on buildings where mul-
tiple households live together like apartments building. The latter is the ratio
of the number of buildings constructed after 1981 divided by the total supply
of buildings. A priori it is unclear how this would impact our dependent vari-
able. One the one hand more recent buildings might be more suitable for PV
installations on the other hand most of the new buildings might be apartments
rather than houses.4
We control for socioeconomic factors. % unemployed is the percentage of
unemployed inhabitants. More unemployment is expected to negatively in-
fluence our dependent variable as investments in PV require a high up-front
cost which is less likely to be available for unemployed people. Population (log
of) is the number of inhabitants. We can expect that in municipalities with
more inhabitants there will be more PV installations, as there will be more po-
tential investors. Median Income (log of) is the median income net of taxes and
we expect that municipalities with wealthier inhabitants will invest more. Av-
erage age is the average age of the inhabitants and we expect that all else being
equal younger people will be more aware of the PV investments possibili-
ties than older people. Hence we anticipate a negative sign for this control
the tariff as a control variable or using the peak/off-peak tariffs in the case where there is a
meter measuring these two flows separately does not impact our results.
3Note that the tariff data is missing for some GRD for the year 2008. We still analyse our
data as if it was balanced.
4Unfortunately we do not have data about the share of households that rent instead have
own the place where they live on a yearly base. However, we believe that this factor is rather
stable over the years of our sample.
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variable. % foreigners measures the percentage of households with a foreign
nationality. As foreigners are likely to come from a less well-off socioeconomic
background and to be less aware of the subsidies available (due to linguistic
issues and a more general lack of information), the coefficient of this variable
is likely to be negative. All these control variables come from Walstat.
Finally we control for what we call political factors. Local subsidies is the
level of the up-front subsidies granted to PV installers at the municipality and
province level. We took the log and have added a small constant due to the
presence of zero’s. This information was collected by ourselves by collect-
ing data from various sources, including the administration of the munici-
palities/provinces themselves.5 % vote green party is the percentage of votes
received by the green party at the regional elections that took place in 2004,
2009 and 2014 at the canton level. We do not consider municipal election re-
sults as for those elections political parties do not always participate under
their usual name and often form ad-hoc electoral list with other party mem-
bers. We expect this variable to be a good proxy of the awareness of citizens
towards renewable energy sources.
Descriptive statistics are available in Table 2.
4 Empirical strategy
Our objective is to study the impact of electricity tariffs on the decision to in-
stall PV using a closed-form approach. We take advantage of the panel nature
of our municipality-level data in order to reach close to causal claims about
this relationship. The specificity of the Wallonian context is also an advan-
5When the subsidies were provided in the form of a percentage rebate of the up-front
investment cost, we transformed this information in a lump sum subsidy approximated by
the average capacity of the installation made in each municipality each year and the average
cost per kWp that specific year.
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tage, as tariffs are set differently in the 13 distribution system operators while
the rest of bill depends on market forces and policies set at the regional and
national level.
Let Yi,t denote the number of PV installations in municipality i in year t.
We model Yi,t as a function of our explanatory variable and control variables.
A first specification can be written as follows:
Yi,t = α+ βtari f fi,t + γXi,t + µi + φt + ei,t
where α is a constant term, tari f fi,t is our explanatory variable, Xi,t is a vector
of municipality-level covariates described earlier and ei,t is a mean-zero error
term. We also include municipality fixed dummies µi and year dummies φt.
Taking advantage of the panel structure of our data allows us to control
for sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Municipality fixed-effects help us to
implicitly consider municipality-specific omitted variables that are constant
over time such as locational aspects (size of the area, solar orientation, weather
conditions, etc.). Year fixed-effects control for broader trends in adoption of
PV due to changes in tagged prices of panels, policies set at the regional and
national level or an overall increase in awareness about solar energy. In ad-
dition to these fixed-effects, control variables will diminish the presence of
the omitted variable bias by taking explicitly into consideration some form of
heterogeneity evolving across time and place that is measurable.
One big issue when using a linear model is that it is not well-suited for our
count data setting. For this purpose, we have fitted a Poisson model to take
care of the non-linear nature of our data. As the data is not Poisson distributed
and over dispersion of our dependent variable is an issue, the misspecified
variance is corrected using a sandwich variance estimator. As shown in our
robustness checks, these results are robust to the one obtained via negative
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binomial models which are more adequate to handle over dispersion but at
the cost of stronger distributional assumptions (Cameron and Trivedi (2013)).
Note finally that the presence of zero outcomes is limited in our sample.
One final important thing to note is that in our preferred specification we
have lagged by one year our explanatory variable. Hence, we use tari f fi,t−1
as an independent variable instead of tari f fi,t. There are a number of explana-
tions for this assumption. First of all, one theoretical explanation is that house-
holds do not necessarily respond to contemporaneous tariffs but to lagged
tariffs, as stipulated on their electricity bill which is received only later after
the consumption of electricity. Households might find it difficult to evaluate
how new tariffs might impact their returns to invest in solar panels as elec-
tricity consumption is only paid ex-post (Ito (2014)). As discussed in Jacqmin
(2018), there might as well be delays due to administrative and installation
reasons. Beside these explanations, using a one-year lag is also suggested us-
ing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz Criterion (BIC),
even though analyzing contemporaneous data does not change the quality of
our results. A bi-product of the one-year lag between our explanatory and
dependent variable is that it reduces the scope for reverse causality.
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5 Results and discussion
Table 3: Results
Dep. var. (1) (2) (3)
# of PV installations
Tariff (t) 0.026* 0.028**
(0.0137) (0.014)
Tariff (t-1) 0.058*** 0.041***
(0.015) (0.015)
% of houses 0.021 0.013 0.014
(0.02) (0.022) (0.025)
% built after 81 -0.122*** -0.147*** -0.16***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.037)
% unemployed -0.079*** -0.08*** -0.072***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Median income (log of) 1.114 0.858 1.11
(0.871) (0.924) (0.916)
Population (log of) 2.501* 2.599* 3.583**
(1.49) (1.558) (1.605)
% foreigners -0.053** -0.046* -0.039
(0.027) (0.027) (0.03)
Average Age -0.058 -0.016 0.021
(0.064) (0.066) (0.065)
Local subsidies (log of) 0.008 0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
% vote green party -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Year FE yes yes yes
Municipality FE yes yes yes
N 2031 1776 1776
log likelihood -7216.93 -6359.13 -20530.22
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
Statistical significance: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Our main results are presented in Table 3. They all use the number of new
PV installations as a dependant variable and a Poisson model. Regression
(1) compares contemporaneous values of the number of PV installations and
the distribution tariff. By taking advantage of the panel structure of our data,
we are able to implicitly control for factors fixed over time and place using
fixed effects.6 Focusing on our variable of interest, we now find that an in-
crease in one eurocent of the distribution tariff leads to an increase in 2.7%
in the number of new PV installations.7 The other coefficients estimated in
this regression tend to be in adequacy with our predictions and stable across
methodologies. We observe that having a larger share of recently constructed
buildings leads to less PV installations. One explanation of this result is that
recently constructed building tend to be apartment blocks, rented or owned
by their inhabitants, where it is less suitable to make this kind of investments.
Next, we find that a higher unemployment rate means that there will be less
investments in solar panels, probably because unemployed inhabitants are
less likely to be owners and to be able to finance this type of long term invest-
ments. As expected, we also find that municipalities with more inhabitants
observe more installations. Finally, having more foreigners among its inhab-
itants leads to less installations as this part of the population might be less
inclined to be aware of the large, though complex, subsidies available when
installing solar panels. The other coefficients are not statistically different from
zero.
The next regression reproduces regression (1), albeit one key change. In-
6When using random effect estimators, the quality of our results remains untouched. Fol-
lowing the results of the Hausman test, the null hypothesis of no systematic difference be-
tween fixed and random effects is rejected. Hence, the fixed effect estimator is more consis-
tent.
7Note that when using a pooled Poisson regression we estimate that the increase will
be of 28%. This overestimation confirms the importance of taking advantage of the panel
dimension of our data to decrease the omitted variable bias.
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stead of comparing contemporaneously the dependent and explanatory vari-
able, a one year of lag between them is introduced. As discussed, in the previ-
ous section, taking a one year lag can be defended on several grounds. First,
a theoretical explanation lies in the fact that people optimize with respect to
their bills rather than the tagged price, as one of the specificity of the elec-
tricity market is that you pay your bill only much after you have consumed
the good in question. Second, it mitigates contemporaneous feedback effects,
that could bias our results. Finally, various information criteria (AIC and BIC)
encourage us to use this approach rather than the one comparing contempo-
raneous data.8 Comparing the coefficients of our variable of interest in regres-
sion (1) and (2), we see that taking a one year lag for our explanatory variable
leads to larger coefficients. The other coefficients tend, on the other hand, to
be similar. In regression (2), with a coefficient of 0.058, we see that lagging
our explanatory variable compared to our dependent variable, inflates our
results compared to the one of regression (1). Hence, the impact of lagged
tariffs on solar investments is more important than the one of contemporary
tariffs. It means that an increase in one eurocent in the tariff leads to, all else
being equal, an increase in 6% in the number of PV installations the year af-
ter. Finally, including both lagged and contemporaneous values of tariffs in
the same model, we observe that both have a significant and positive impact,
although the one of tari f fit−1 is significant at the 1% threshold and the one of
tari f fit only at the 5% threshold. This last result comfort us in the idea that the
impact of tariffs on the decision to install solar panels lies between the results
obtained in regression (1) and (2) but is likely to lean more towards the one
observed in the latter.
8Note however that this leads to a reduction of our sample size, as due to missing tariff
data, one year of observation has to be dropped.
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Table 4: Robustness checks
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years years quantity of with transport OLS Negative
≤ 2013 > 2014 cap. installed tariff included Fixed effects Binomial
Tariff (t-1) 0.054*** -0.145 0.05*** 0.021 0.038** 0.0503***
(0.016) (0.207) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013)
% of houses 0.025 0.214 0.015 0.021 0.012 -0.007
(0.024) (0.223) (0.024) (0.047) (0.028) (0.007)
% built after 81 -0.166*** 0.212 -0.16*** -0.193*** -0.076* -0.026***
(0.038) (0.159) (0.037) (0.043) (0.042) (0.01)
% unemployed -0.096*** -0.151 -0.074*** -0.048** -0.042* -0.022
(0.026) (0.094) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.014)
Median income (log of) 0.825 -1.769 0.983 0.19 -0.134 0.125
(1.076) (3.592) (0.91) (0.95) (1.141) (0.499)
Population (log of) 2.044 2.498 3.591** 3.74** 1.578 0.602***
(1.799) (6.856) (1.604) (1.74) (1.953) (0.083)
% foreigners -0.064* -0.432*** -0.039 -0.009 -0.03 -0.048***
(0.037) (0.166) (0.03) (0.031) (0.036) (0.011)
Average Age -0.05 -0.006 0.024 0.108 -0.07 -0.119***
(0.082) (0.234) (0.065) (0.082) (0.058) (0.028)
Local rebates 0.005 0.031 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.007*
(0.006) (0.021) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
% vote green party -0.003 0.009 -0.008 0.014**
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006)
constant -4.77 1.344
(20.348) (5.327)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Municipality FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 1266 510 1776 1530 1776 1776
log likelihood -4807.77 -590.11 -20570.8 -5145.11 -5403.05
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
Statistical significance: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We provide additional robustness checks in Table 4 and use regression (2)
as benchmark specification. In regression (4) and (5), we split our sample in
two parts, before and after the major change in legislation supporting PV in-
vestments that took place in early 2014. On the one hand, focusing on the time
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period when the Solwatt system was in place, we observe no change compared
to our previous results. On the other hand, focusing on the Qualiwatt system,
we find that the tariff level has no significant impact on the PV investment
decision. This does not come as a surprise as under the Qualiwatt supporting
scheme the benefit for the consumer of a higher grid tariff is partially offset by
a lower premium paid by the DSO. Therefore, the decision to invest should
depend less on differences in the tariff. Furthermore, for regression (5), we
have a limited amount of data available as only two years of data are at our
disposal for the moment. Note in addition that in these two subsamples, there
was no change in % vote green party, as no election took place.
In regression (6), we also take advantage of the availability of data con-
cerning the capacity of each PV installations. For this purpose, we use the
total capacity installed each year in each municipality as a dependent vari-
able. In line with what we have observed so far, we see that an increase in one
eurocent of the grid tariff leads to an increase of about 5% of the capacities
installed.
From the investors’ point of view, another aspect of the PV investment is
differing from one GRD to the other: the transport tariff. This tariff, which is
much smaller than the distribution tariff, about one sixth of the average tariff
bill, also differs across GRD and time. However, as opposed to the distribu-
tion tariff, it differs mostly across time rather than across GRD, as only one
tenth of its variation is explained by the variation between GRD. In regres-
sion (7), we add together the distribution and the transport tariffs to form a
new variable that we use as an explanatory variable. We find that, by using
this new definition of tariff, we observe a decrease in our parameters, which
is now equal to 0.021, as well as on the level of significance, as the p-value is
only of 0.11, above conventional threshold. There are two explanations for this
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change. First, due to one year of missing data of the transport tariff, we loose
one year of observations. Second, the nature of the variation of the transport
tariff leads to a decrease in variation across units of observation.9
Other estimation strategies are pursued in the last two regressions. The
first one is presented in regression (8) and assumes a linear relationship. Be-
fore doing this OLS regression, we take the log of our dependent variable.10
We observe that this does not change the significance nor the size of our coef-
ficient. Finally in regression (9), we estimate a negative binomial regression.
Again this more general approach leads us to results comparable to the one
obtained in regression (2). Overall these results tend to confirm and further
strengthen our initial claim that higher distribution tariffs do lead to more PV
installed and that an increase of 1 eurocent leads to an increase in installation
of around 5%.
6 Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper we study the adoption of photovoltaic panels in a setting where
both a net metering system, where the production of solar panels is valued at
market price, is in place and distribution tariffs are in large part computed on
a volumetric basis. We show that municipalities where the electricity is more
expensive –due to higher grid tariffs– experience a larger deployment of de-
centralized production units. Using data from Wallonia, we measure that, all
else being equal, an increase by one eurocent per kWh of the volumetric tariff
9Note however that (1) by considering the two tariffs separately with two different vari-
ables, (2) by using contemporaneous tariffs as explanatory variables or (3) by focusing on
Solwatt years before 2014, we obtain results similar to the ones of our benchmark specifica-
tion. These results are available upon request.
10Beforehand, we have added a small positive constant to all our dependent variables, as
some of them are equal to zero. Changing the constant in question does not influence the
quality of our results.
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leads to an increase in the number of installations by around 5%. Electricity
users do react by installing more photovoltaic panels, as it helps them decrease
the bill to be paid to the GRD. Hence, a system with a net metering scheme
and high volumetric tariffs highly subsidizes the development of residential
PV installations and the theoretical literature (Brown and Sappington, 2017
and Gautier et al. 2018) has shown that net metering leads to an inefficient
deployment of decentralized production units.
Furthermore, net metering decreases the registered consumption of the
households equipped with PV installations and therefore translates in rev-
enue losses for the GRD. To be able to cover the mostly fixed costs of the GRD,
one policy response would be to further increase volumetric tariffs, worsen-
ing the sustainability of the GRD revenues, as residential users would again
react by installing more PV, leading to the so-called death spiral of utilities
(Costello and Hemphill, 2014). Hence, this work calls for a change of the tari-
fication system in place, in order to rely more on capacity-based tariffs at the
expense of volumetric tariffs.
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